Nothing is more certain than this proposition: A name that is acquired by or imposed on anything that is τὸ δε τὶ (or: singular) can only improperly be shared with something else. Indeed, the mind cannot conceive that that which signifies only one individual thing would be shared with and would signify many things. Thus, the scholastics say that names imposed to signify a singular thing are incommunicable, both in reality and idea, to many things.[2] And it is manifest that a singular[3] subsistens is indicated when we say: [You shall] not [take the name of] Jehovah [your] God [in vain][4] and similar things in the concrete. For this reason, the name God and other similar names that signify the divine essence in the concrete cannot properly be predicated of creatures. Thus, we rightly say that there can only be one true God. In fact, for the reason just alleged, if the name God is set in place to signify the one Jehovah and the one individual essence,[5] then the conclusion is that multiple gods cannot be.

Now, the confirmation of this thesis extends to all those passages in the Holy Scriptures which predicate only one God and which assert that finding any other gods beside this one God is impossible. For example, we read many times in Isaiah: I am God, and beside Me there is no other [Isa. 45:5]. And again: This is My name: “Jehovah,” and I will not give My glory to another, that is, I will not give My deity and essence by which I am called “Jehovah” to anyone else [Isa. 42:8].

We do, however, grant that some creatures have indeed been named with the name God improperly and by way of resemblance, and that they are even so named in the Scriptures themselves. Thus, judges and magistrates are called gods, even by the testimony of Christ (John 10:34). For as God is the world’s judge, so are they. Accordingly, because in this duty they resemble God, they are rightly called gods on account of that resemblance.

Thus, we read in the Scriptures that even the name Jehovah—notwithstanding the fact that it is the supremely proper name of God and of the divine essence—was attributed to creatures. And this was the case not only with rational creatures, like angels, but even with inanimate creatures, as in Psalm 24:7[–8] when the ark of the Lord is called Jehovah and the King of glory, albeit improperly. The reason is because the ark was the testimony and symbol of the presence of Jehovah Himself. In the same way, the sacramental symbols of bread and wine are called by the names of the things whereof they are the signs: Christ’s body and blood. And likewise, the water is called the laver of regeneration, and the dove and tongues of fire are called the Holy Spirit [Titus 3:5; Matt. 3:16; Acts 2:3]. But based on the circumstances of the passages of divine Scripture where these names are attributed to created things, it is manifestly clear that they are addressed by those names improperly.

In fact, you never read in the Scriptures of the name Jehovah having been attributed to anyone else, as we have shown more than sufficiently elsewhere. But although Scripture sometimes calls idols gods, despite the fact that they do not have any real resemblance to God nor do they fulfil any of His duties, it does not do so because it condones this sort of naming, as is the case with other things about which this has been said. Rather, when Scripture calls idols gods, it names them ironically and on the basis of what gentile idolaters believe. This is seen in the case in Corinth: Although many are called “gods,” for there are many gods (in men’s opinion), yet for us, and so on (1 Cor. 8:5).

Thus, in this case, the name god is neither properly nor improperly predicated of idols but rather falsely and mendaciously. Accordingly, this fourth thesis remains solid: Names signifying God or the divine essence in the concrete cannot be predicated of creatures, except very improperly.