Creatures can also be named by any names that are predicated of God—that describe what He is like—but only those perfections that can be communicated to creatures and only insofar as they are communicated.
Five Books on the Nature of God,
or
On the Divine Attributes
or
On the Divine Attributes
By Girolamo Zanchi
Translated by Patrick J. O'Banion
Book 1, Chapter 9, Quaestio 7, Part 3
Volume 1 is available for order now from Merchant Royal Press
The Third Thesis
Any names that signify what God is like can also be predicated properly of creatures, insofar as the things signified by those names can be suitable for creatures.
I
say insofar as the things themselves can be suitable because some are utterly unsuitable. These include being eternal, immense, and most simple. And thus, the names immortality, immensity, simplicity, and similar divine properties can in no way be predicated of creatures. But the remaining names can be communicated to creatures, albeit only in part and imperfectly. For example, to be utterly and simply powerful or to be omnipotent, supremely good, just, or wise—these are hardly appropriate for created thing, but being merely powerful, good, or righteous is appropriate. And so, neither can the names supremely wise or omnipotent be predicated of creatures but merely wise or powerful.
Now, the reason why these names can be truly predicated of created things is because such perfections have also really been and are communicated to us. In fact, those whom God, by the gifts of His Spirit, makes faithful, righteous, good, merciful, and wise truly are such, albeit imperfectly, because these are God’s genuine gifts whereby we truly are like God. That is why in Ephesians 4[:24] the apostle calls the righteousness and holiness, which is bestowed upon us and for which the new man is created, true righteousness and holiness.
And besides, no one has ever claimed that a creature that is said to be good, righteous, prudent, or wise is to be called thus or is thus except according to a certain likeness [that it has to the reality of those attributes]. They are not to be called thus nor are they thus truly and according to the true signification [of those attributes]. To be sure, when Scripture says, Everything that God created was very good, it understood everything to be good properly speaking [Gen. 1:31]. Moreover, names that are spoken of a thing according to its true and real meaning (rather than by means of similitude) are said to be properly predicated. Accordingly, nothing is more certain than that creatures can also be named by any names that are predicated of God—that describe what He is like—but only those perfections that can be communicated to creatures and only insofar as they are communicated.
The reason why this phrase was added has now been sufficiently explained. The next thesis, therefore, follows.
The Fourth Thesis
Names that signify properties or perfections of the sort that creatures are incapable of receiving can, indeed, be maximally predicated of God but cannot be predicated of creatures in any way.
N
ow, first of all, these are names which signify a perfection of the sort that is appropriate for God alone, such as if you add supreme or supremely [to a perfection]: supreme good, supreme being, supremely wise, or supremely powerful. Therefore, in order to distinguish the true God from created gods in some way, they call Him God Most High.
Next are those names which signify eternity, simplicity, infinity, or immensity. Clearly, all of these names are spoken of God alone. Hence, they distinguish Him from creatures. For nothing of that sort can be eternal, most simple, and so on.