Analogical names, however, are those which do indeed have the same name but, in sense and definition, are neither entirely the same nor utterly different. Instead, they have a particular proportion and correspondence to a primary thing such that the name of the primary is always placed in the definition of those following it. For example, man is said to be healthy; medicine is also called healthy, and so is a steady pulse, but in what sense? In fact, this is said in a diverse sense, but nevertheless in a way that is somehow symmetrical and harmonious, such that the term healthy is predicated of the one first, and then of the others. Man is properly and principally called healthy because he is the subject of health and is formally healthy. In turn, a steady pulse is called healthy because it is a sign of health. Finally, medicine [is called healthy] insofar as it is a cause of being healthy. Notice how the name healthy, which in and of itself and in the first place is appropriate for a living thing, necessarily enters into the definition of the other two.

Furthermore, it is beyond controversy that the things that are said of God and of creatures are not predicated univocally. To take one example, goodness is altogether perfect in God. In Him, goodness is not an accident but is the uncreated divine essence itself. In us, however, it is a created and imperfect accident. Hence, although goodness is called by the same name both in us and in God, yet, because the definition of His goodness and ours is not the same, the word goodness cannot be said to be predicated univocally of God and of us.

But nor can it be said to be predicated altogether equivocally. For when something is said equivocally, no consideration is given to the relationship between the things, nor is any relationship[3] signified to exist. For what relationship, I ask, does a ram (siege engine) have with the ram (constellation)? Or with a ram (land animal)? For the fact that both a constellation and a specific kind of siege engine and a certain land animal are all called by the name ram is merely an accidental matter. The same thing happens with all equivocal names.

However, a truly beautiful relationship exists between God and the things created by Him. For God is both the efficient and final cause of all created things and, thus, they have a relationship toward Him. They are, in part, related to Him in the way that effects are related to the cause that brings them about and, in part, as means are related to the end unto which all things are ordained. And this is how Scripture speaks: From Him and through Him and to Him are all things (Rom. 11[:36]).

From this follows another reason: Created things are the means whereby we are led to a knowledge of God the Creator, as by effects unto the cause. And this is what the letter to the Romans teaches. Surely this should not be included among things said equivocally, for what benefit would the knowledge of a ram (siege engine) be for the knowledge of the ram (constellation)? None at all. But the invisible things of God, having been made known, are observed by means of the things that have been made, namely, His eternal power and divinity (Rom. 1[:20]).

Add to this the following reason: Where no similitude exists, knowledge of the one does not lead to knowledge of the other. This is something that is seen in all equivocals, where merely the name is shared but the thing is entirely and absolutely distinct. Yet, a similitude between God and created things exists. For, as has often been said, when it comes to perfections or to being itself, all are similar to God. Accordingly, it cannot be the case that what is said of God and creatures is predicated equivocally. For if, for example, the goodness that is discerned in creatures is predicated of God equivocally, how, I wonder, would one prove on the basis of the goodness of created things that the God who created them is far better?