For God has named and described Himself with many names in His Holy Scriptures, and He did so for our sake, so that by them He Himself might indicate to us how useful it is for us to know who He is and what He is like.
Five Books on the Nature of God,
or
On the Divine
or
On the Divine
By Girolamo Zanchi
Translated by Patrick J. O’Banion
Book 1, Chapter 2
Volume 1 is available for order now from Merchant Royal Press
Chapter Two
The division of chapters and the quaestiones explained in the first book.
First, we must explain what we mean when we say the divine names. We do not, in fact, need to ask whether God is named by some name or names and, hence, whether any divine names exist, since this is not disputed. For God has named and described Himself with many names in His Holy Scriptures, and He did so for our sake, so that by them He Himself might indicate to us how useful it is for us to know who He is and what He is like. Indeed, in Proverbs 30:4, we read these words about God and His Son in which Agur asks: What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if you know? Yet, the point of this verse is not to prove an absence of names that indicate or name God, since in that same passage even Agur, the very one who is saying this, calls God by the names Jehovah and Eloah [vv. 9 and 5, respectively].
Rather, Agur’s intent was merely to indicate that He who made all these things through the Son is certainly God, and one may ask for wisdom from Him. But not everyone knows this God and His Son. That is, He is unknown to those to whom He has not revealed Himself as He presented Himself to the patriarchs to be known among His holy people. Nor, indeed, was He so perfectly known to the patriarchs before Moses as He was to Moses and, ultimately, as He is to us in Christ. That is why He said, in a verse that we will explain later: I am the Lord who appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, אל שדי [El Shaddai]; and I did not tell them My name יהוה [Jehovah] (Ex. 6:3). For this reason, to ask whether there are divine names would be an utterly foolish question, since Holy Scripture is full of them.[1] Hence, instead of asking whether there are true names whereby God is named or whether we may find them, we should instead ask what we ought specifically to understand by the expression of divine names.
The second section will address the variety of divine names. Since these names—not only those whereby God is denominated but also those that are predicated of God—are nearly infinite in number and not all of them are of the same class and order, we must divide and distinguish them into distinct orders.
The third section will discuss the use of all the names, that is, how manifold and what are the uses on account of which God revealed these names to us and established them.
To be sure, certain quaestiones immediately offer themselves for explanation based on what was previously said. And of them, this will be the first: Is any name appropriate for God (who, in a certain sense, is everything and infinite, immense and incomprehensible) whereby He may be distinguished from other things, revealed, and made known to us? For a name is given because it expresses information about the recipient of the name. But God is incomprehensible. Therefore: The divine, being incomprehensible, is also necessarily nameless [John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 12b].[2]
A second quaestio is: If we do find a name that signifies God’s nature, have we then also found something whereby His essence is made known or that predicates of God substantially? For since, on account of God’s immensity, no one can comprehend His essence, it seems that no name can be found that signifies His essence. And this is precisely what the Damascene says: Therefore, since we do not know its essence, we should not seek out its name ([On the Orthodox Faith,] bk. 1, ch. 12b).[3]
A third quaestio is: May we come up with any names that predicate God properly? Or do they all do so improperly?
Fourth: Since God is truly one and most simple, does His unity and simplicity come into conflict with the fact that He is not named by a single, simple name but by many different names, and that an almost innumerable quantity of things is predicated of Him?
Fifth: If many names do not conflict with God’s unity and simplicity, is it not, then, the case that the many and various names predicated of God are rather synonyms signifying one and the same thing rather than different things?
Sixth: A great many of the names predicated of God are derived from creatures—even lowly creatures—but God infinitely excels all creatures. Is it, then, really fitting for God to be called by names such as “stone,” “tower,” and “shield”?
Seventh: Can all of the names that are predicated of creatures also be predicated of God? Or can certain ones be predicated of Him but others not? And which are which? And conversely, can all of the things that are pronounced of God also be pronounced of creatures?
Eighth: Since many names are spoken of God and creatures, how are they pronounced of God and created things? Is this done univocally, equivocally, or neither univocally nor equivocally but in some other way?
Ninth: Since God is eternal and nothing new may befall Him, are any of the names that are temporally appropriate for Him eternally inappropriate for Him?
Finally, once these quaestiones, which handle the general teaching for understanding the attributes (and, consequently, the Holy Scriptures) have been addressed, I will speak of the significance and use of God’s principal names.
[1] Note that Thomas Aquinas had begun his treatment of the divine names by asking: “Whether a name can be given to God” (ST, I, q. 13, art. 1).
[2] τὸ θεῖον ἀκατάληπτον ὂν πάντως καὶ ἀνώνυμον. Quoted from John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, trans. Norman Russell, Popular Patristics Series 62 (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2022), 88. Pseudo-Dionysius makes a similar point in The Divine Names (ch. 1, §5): “How then can we speak of the divine names? How can we do this if the Transcendent surpasses all discourse and all knowledge, if it abides beyond the reach of mind and of being, if it encompasses and circumscribes, embraces and anticipates all things while itself eluding their grasp and escaping from any perception, imagination, opinion, name, discourse, apprehension, or understanding? How can we enter upon this undertaking if the Godhead is superior to being and is unspeakable and unnameable [sic]?” Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, ed. Paul Rorem, trans. Colm Luibhéid, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Paulist Press, 1987), 53.
Note that, although this material is typically assigned to ch. 12b of On the Orthodox Faith, Zanchi probably worked with the Basel, 1548 edition produced by Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, which designated this as ch. 13. See Wang, “Girolamo Zanchi and Divine Names” (2026), 155–56. Subsequent references to ch. 13 will be listed as ch. 12b without comment.
[3] Ἀγνοῦντες τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ μὴ ἐκζητήσωμεν ὄνομα. Quoted from John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 88.