The reason why we are good, strong, and intelligent (and so on ... ) is because this goodness flows into us from God, as from a fountain.
Five Books on the Nature of God,
or
On the Divine Attributes
or
On the Divine Attributes
By Girolamo Zanchi
Translated by Patrick J. O'Banion
Book 1, Chapter 9, Quaestio 7, Part 2
Volume 1 is available for order now from Merchant Royal Press
The Second Thesis
Every name that is spoken of God metaphorically[1] is first predicated of creatures and then of God.
The reason for this is that names of this kind only signify similarities with the sort of things from which the names are taken and of which they are, thus, first predicated. This is why, for example’s sake, when the Holy Scriptures call God a lion, what Scripture mean is that, in His works, God behaves boldly and vigorously, in a lion-like manner. Accordingly, first, the nature of a lion must first be defined—namely, what it is—and then it must be shown that, on account of that virtue of boldness, God is like a lion and, so, is rightly called a lion.
But two things must be taken into consideration as regards the other names which, having been predicated of creatures, are also said of God essentially, such as good, righteous, and so forth: the things signified by the names and the bestowal of names. The things signified were and are first in God (that is, from eternity) and, thus, they have flowed and do flow into creatures through creation. In fact, the reason why we are good, strong, and intelligent (and so on with regard to the others) is because this goodness flows into us from God, as from a fountain. Thus, it is also said of Christ: Of His fullness we have all received [John 1:16]. Therefore, all these things preexisted in God, like water in a fountain from which it springs forth.
Hence, if we are focusing on things [signified], then the names signified by these things are predicated first of God rather than of created things. On that account, He is called just and justifying. That is, before He makes others just, He is called just and He is just. And He grants that the just might truly be so named, and He is holy before He makes us holy. He says: Be holy because I also am holy (namely, before you were) [Lev. 11:44; 1 Peter 1:16].
But if we are focusing on the bestowal of names, then they are first said of creatures rather than of God. For, setting aside names invented by men to signify both the substances and natures of things as well as their qualities, God Himself actually gave [indidit] various qualities, strengths, and virtues to created things and, likewise, even taught men the names by which they were named. Then, He used eloquent words to explain what He was like, just as we read that He subsequently explained to Moses and the prophets. And so it happened that men first knew things and their virtues and then they knew God, such that they were actually led to a knowledge of God by them, as the apostle teaches in Romans.
And indeed, when God revealed Himself to the fathers in times past, calling Himself strong, good, merciful, powerful, and righteous, He revealed Himself only with names with which men had already been familiar and which they used to designate similar virtues in created things. In fact, God even derived the very names whereby He properly signified His own essence—for which reason they are called God’s own names [propria Dei nomina]—from the names of created things.
For where do Yah[2] and Jehovah[3] and Ehyeh[4] come from, if not from hayah[5] (being)? That is to say, although no created thing is called by these names—which is the reason why they are called God’s own names—nevertheless, if you focus on the [Hebrew] root, things were said to have been havah[6] prior to God calling Himself Yah[7] or Jehovah[8] or Ehyeh.[9] And thus, created things were called by the name τῶν ὄντων [things that are] in order that God might, on that account, call Himself τὸν ὄντα [the One who is][10]—and likewise with the Hebrew names derived from being. He did this in order to signify that He is true being and the cause of all beings.
Therefore, as far as the actual things signified by the names are concerned, they first preexisted in God. But if you are considering the bestowal of names, they were first bestowed upon things, either by God or by men, and then God was willing to name and describe Himself with them as well. And enough has been said with regard to the question proposed in passing, namely, whether the names predicated of creatures as well as of God are first predicated of creatures and then of God or whether it is the reverse. But on the basis of everything that has been said thus far concerning the seventh question, the first part of this question is made clear, namely, whether everything predicated of creatures is also to be predicated of God. Now, the second part follows: Whether everything that is predicated of God can also be predicated of creatures. Accordingly, let the following be the third thesis of the seventh quaestio.
[1] μεταφορικῶς.
[2] יה.
[3] יהוה.
[4] אהיה.
[5] היה.
[6] הוה.
[7] הי.
[8] יהוה.
[9] אהיה.
[10] The Wisdom of Solomon refers to both τῶν ὄντων (7:17) and τὸν ὄντα (13:1). The latter, which is predicated of God, is understood to be a variation on the “I am” of Exodus 3:14 (rendered ὁ ὤν in the LXX). See McCarthy, “Exod 3:14: History, Philology and Theology,” 317.